Authoritarian Norm Contestation and
International Broadcasting:
RT’ s norm contestation strategy
during the Ukraine Crisis
ABSTRACT：
Norm contestation is a burgeoning area of research within International
Relations(IR), particularly in the context of the evolving multi-order world. While critical constructivists have shed light on the dialogical nature of norm evolution and the signifcant role of discourses in norm construction, they have given little attention to the communicational process underlying these discourses. This paper argues that state-funded international broadcasters play a pivotal role in the contestation of the validity, meaning, and applicatory parameters of international norms. Unlike institutional contexts, international broadcasters do not contest norms through arguments but by projecting narratives using strategic assemblages of verbal, aural, and visual elements. Through an analysis of RT’s coverage of the Ukraine Crisis (2014), the paper explicates how Russian state-sponsored propaganda has employed techniques such as liberal performance, liberal mimicry, civilizational essentialization, and counter-norm entrepreneurship to advance a favourable understanding of norms for Russia. The paper aims to contribute to the scholarship on norm contestation by authoritarian states, particularly by applying and attesting to Bettiza and Lewis’s(2020) typology of norm contestation. Furthermore, it seeks to explore and theorize the relationship between norms and narratives in the ever-shifting global media ecology.
KEYWORDS：
Norm contestation；
Ukraine Crisis；
RT；
Russia；
Ukraine；
Geopolitical confict
Introduction
The contestation of norms via international broadcasters by authoritarian states is a topic of utmost importance in the felds of international relations and international communication, as it speaks to the very heart of the interconnectedness of these disciplines. Despite optimistic predictions regarding the inclusiveness and resilience of the liberal order (Ikenberry 2018a, 2018b; Johnston 2003), scholars are increasingly turning their attention to the malleability of liberal norms and the attempts of emerging powers to resist, reinterpret, and appropriate them (Lee et al. 2020; Wilson., 2019). While India’s and Brazil’s contestation over norms such as Responsibility to protection and Humanitarian intervention are theorized as an emancipatory contestation (Kenkel & Destradi 2019; Stefan 2017), Russia’s negotiation eforts are viewed with more suspicion, with some scholars arguing that its intention is to overturn the entire normative order (Lee et al. 2020; Stent 2020; Wilson 2019). While opinions on Russia’s revisionist powers are divided, scholars agree that it is negotiating the normative order within its neighbouring region, which it considers a sphere of infuence due to geopoliticalsignifcance and cultural proximity (Allison 2020; Bettiza & Lewis 2020; Jose & Stefes 2018; Strating 2020). Despite the existing literature’s focus on Russia’s eforts to redefne the meaning of norms, little attention has been paid to the mediated communication process the country employs to construct consensual meaning for international norms.
This paper will commence by undertaking a comprehensive review of the nascent literature on norm contestation in authoritarian states with a particular emphasis on the typology proposed by Bettiza and Lewis (2020). Subsequently, the paper will delve into an examination of the intricate relationship between narrative and norm change, with particular attention being paid to the mechanisms through which normative narratives are conveyed via visual media. The establishment of a robust theoretical framework will provide the foundation for the subsequent analytical investigation. Based on an examination of RT’s coverage of the Ukraine Crisis, this paper demonstrates how Russia utilizes international broadcasters to promote alternative interpretations of norms that challenge the hegemonic status of the West in formulating, interpreting, and implementing international norms. Our investigation indicates that all the four modes of contestation have appeared in RT’s coverage of the Ukraine crisis: Liberal performance, Liberal mimicry, Civilizational essentialization, and Counternorm entrepreneurship to delegitimise the moral credibility of the West and promote the authority of Russia to create, interpret and apply norms. The study’s fndings underscore its contribution to the scholarship on illiberal norm contestation, the interaction between narrative and norms, and authoritarian propaganda.
Norm contestation theory in evolution
The study of norms has become an essential element in International Relations as constructivists have emphasized the central role of ideas and identities in shaping global politics (Checkel 1998; Onuf 1989). Scholars in norm research seek to identify the trajectory of norm difusion, following the model proposed by Martha Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) on the life cycle of norms. In the wake of US-led liberal globalization, early studies focused on the dissemination of liberal norms, including women’s sufrage, human rights, and environmentalism (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Risse & Sikkink 1999), revealing a distinct liberal bias. This approach to norm studies assumed a linear progression of norm difusion, where Western powers served as “active teachers” instructing the socialization of liberal norms. The Risse’s et al. (1999) spiral model suggests that successful norm difusion often requires the complete transformation of identities by recipient countries for admission to the liberal community. Although norm difusion models have made a signifcant contribution to understanding the dynamics of norm transmission, their analytical value is overshadowed by the growing literature on norm contestation, which refects theoretical defciencies and emerging empirical situations.
Norm contestation scholarship has gained momentum from three signifcant shifts: (1) an ontology shift from viewing norms as static objects to recognizing their fuid nature; (2) a perspective shift from emphasizing structure to highlighting agency; and (3) a power dynamic shift from socialization to resistance. Rather than perceiving norms as stable, intersubjective structures, norm contestation scholarship argues that they are fuid and that their meaning-in-use is enacted in specifc social and cultural contexts, subject to constant negotiation, interpretation, and revision (Wiener, 2014: 27). Recognizing the fuidity of norms challenges the notion of stable shared meaning and reveals the polysemic nature of norms (Linsenmaier et al. 2021). Second, the agency of norm takers has been re-discovered in normative dynamics, as norm contestation researchers are inspired by postcolonial critique to highlight the agency of those who adopt and adapt norms. They suggest that the for mation of international consensus on norms entails localized input and may produce a variety of regional norm variants (Acharya 2009, 2018). As illustrated by Acharya(2009), while both Latin America and East Asia have embraced the norm of sovereignty and non-intervention, they have developed divergent approaches, with legalistic regional institutions and informal consultative mechanisms serving as institutional embodiments of the norms. Third, Critical theorists have also sought to reveal the power relations underlying norm fow by demystifying the Eurocentrism embedded in the one-way fow of norm difusion. By criticizing Finnemore’s overemphasis on the seemingly power-free international institutions in promoting liberal norms (Barnett & Finnemore 2012, 1999; Finnemore 1996), Hobson (2012) has pointed out that Finnemore and her colleagues actually naturalize the hierarchical structure between the West and the East. Echoing Hobson’s critique, Epstein, (2012) argues that the frame of socialization infantilizes those who are socialized and normalizes the domination imposed by the West on the Rest. To dispel the paternalistic power relation, it is crucial to recognize the operation of representational force and power politics of identity underlying the construction of normativity (Mattern 2005). The emergence of norm contestation can be attributed to several factors. Acharya (2004), posits that local actors resist global norms by adapting them to ft their cultural context. Acharya’s (2011) research on the spread of cooperative security and non-interference norms among ASEAN states reveals that local actors selectively C. Zhang apply, re-interpret, and create norms to maintain their autonomy, sovereignty, and cultural uniqueness within the global normative landscape. Alternatively, another line of literature argues that contestation stems from the legitimacy gap between fundamental norms and standardized procedures. This requires ongoing contestation among stakeholders to bridge the gap (Wiener, 2014). The need to balance diferent parts of the rules and to adapt general norms to concrete exigencies fuels norm contestation (Sandholtz 2008; Wiener, 2014). Wiener’s focus on contestation within a normative community distinguishes her from Acharya. Inclusive normative deliberation is expected to strengthen norms by refning and generating norm legitimacy (Hofmann 2010). However, inter-community norm contestation, particularly on the morality of norms, is more likely to weaken norm robustness (Deitelhof & Zimmermann 2018; McKeown 2009).While norm contestation between the Global North and Global South empowers marginalized local agencies against hegemonic powers (Blaney & Tickner 2017), contestation between the West and the East (liberal versus authoritarian states) involves a noticeable power politics logic (Goddard & Nexon 2016). Unlike the conventional realist approach that implies power politics is implemented with norms, authoritarian norm contestation studies regard power politics as being operated within norms (Kratochwil 1989). This means that power contentions take place in the ideational realm, where political actors use symbolic instruments to advance their preferred normative interpretations (Lantis 2016). Betcy Jose (2017, 2018), Carmen Wunderlich (2020), and Bettiza Gregorio and David Lewis (2020) make notable contributions to understanding how authoritarian states employ their propaganda apparatus to conduct norm contestation.
Norm contestation and authoritarian powers
For Jose, the contentedness of norms arises from norm ambiguity, the polysemic nature of norms. Contestation over normative meanings are likely to erupt when political actors hold diferent understandings on the prescriptions and parameters of norms (Jose 2017; Shannon, 2000). In other words, along with the decline of norm enforcers, contesters would exploit the ambiguity of norms and project alternative interpretations on the expected behaviours and triggering conditions for certain norms (Jose 2017). Using the cases of Syrian war and the Ukraine crisis, Jose and Stefes (2018) explicate how Russia reconstructs the non-intervention norms to justify Russia’s intervention beyond its territorial boundaries. Agreeing upon the general principle for international community to intervene given massive human rights violation occur, Russia promotes a consensual intervention variant that precondition intervention on the invitation of target government. The scope of humanitarian intervention also shrinks from total civilian community to Russian ethnics and citizens abroad (Jose & Stefes 2018). Here Russia’s re-appropriation of the liberal normResponsibility to Protect- does not seek to overthrow the validity of the norm, but to challenge the hegemony of the West in generating and interpreting norms. While Jose’s norm contestation theory brings to the limelight interpretive power over liberal normative order, her elaboration on the argumentative strategies appears rough. This is where Wunderlich’s work come to compensate.
Informed by Nye’s (1990, 2008) infuential notion of soft power, Wunderlich advances the theory of norm contestation by elucidating the rhetorical tactics employed by norm contesters. Wunderlich (2020) advances norm contestation theory by examining the rhetorical tools used by norm contesters. Wunderlich identifes three key instruments employed by norm contesters: framing, positive incentives, and naming, shaming, and blaming. While earlier studies on norm diffusion highlighted the importance of generating frames in line with existing ones to garner support (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998), norm advocates also use positive incentives such as praises and rewards to encourage normative compliance (Keck & Sikkink 1998). On the other hand, norm contesters frequently employ naming, shaming, and blaming to expose the inconsistency between the referent actors’ actions and discourses, using rhetoric coercion to ensure norm adoption (Björkdahl 2008). While previous literature mainly focused on how liberal norm entrepreneurs shame norm adopters to monitor norm acceptance, Wunderlich’s (2020) study demonstrates that authoritarian powers, such as Iran, also use shaming to delegitimize Western powers for their inconsistent application of liberal norms.
Furthermore, Wunderlich’s research on rogue states uncovers the heterogeneity of authoritarian powers’ norm contestation strategies. Despite their common embracement of illiberal values, authoritarian states vary their norm contestation strategies according to their relations to the dominant ruling order. Wunderlich (2020) identifes two main modes of norm contestation: reformist and revolutionary. Reformist norm contestation seeks to strengthen norms by modifying them according to shifting contexts, while revolutionary norm contestation aims to undermine the current normative order by manipulating prevailing norms or openly questioning the validity or fairness of referent norms. In summary, Wunderlich’s (2020) research provides a comprehensive examination of the rhetorical tools employed by norm contesters, demonstrating the heterogeneity of authoritarian powers’ norm contestation strategies. Bettiza and Lewis (2020) expand on this dichotomy by specifying four modes of norm contestation by authoritarian powers, from constructive contestation that targets applicatory terms and meaning to validity-oriented disruptive contestation.
Bettiza and Lewis (2020) ofer a valuable perspective on the role of norm entrepreneurs in challenging the validity, applicability, and meaning of norms. Building on the work of Deitelhof and Zimmermann (2018), who identifed validity contestation, which attacks the normative obligations of a given norm, and applicatory contestation, which questions the conditions and appropriate actions specifed by the norm, Bettiza and Lewis expand the conceptual framework to include meaning contestation, which contests the expected behaviours of the norm’s addressees. The authors propose that the intensity of norm contestation increases from applicatory contestation to meaning contestation and ultimately to validity contestation. Furthermore, Bettiza and Lewis distinguish between four types of norm contestation by authoritarian powers along a spectrum ranging from reformist to revolutionary: liberal performance, liberal mimicry, civilizational essentialization, and counter-norm entrepreneurship. This typology illuminates the ways in which authoritarian powers strategically deploy normative discourses to advance their interests and challenge the legitimacy of prevailing norms.
The concept of liberal performance refers to the phenomenon where authoritarian regimes adopt the language of liberalism, exposing the inconsistencies in the application of liberal norms by Western powers, thereby discrediting them. This practice involves accusing the United States of violating human rights during the global war on terror and attacking the European Union for its emerging racism and xenophobia (Bettiza & Lewis 2020; Lewis 2022). Russia commonly employs the heuristic device of double standards to expose the gap between Western rhetoric and behaviour regarding liberal norms (Headley 2015). While liberal performance has been observed as a vital discursive strategy used by Russia’s English-language TV channel-RT, further empirical examination is required to confrm this assertion (Rawnsley 2015).
Another mode of norm contestation is liberal mimicry, where liberal norms are given illiberal meanings. Mimicry, according to postcolonial theorist Bhabha, involves using the colonizer’s discourse to undermine their authority (Bhabha 1984). Liberal mimicry is disruptive to the liberal world order as it sows confusion and distraction (Cooley 2015). In the cases of the Georgia and Ukraine crises, Russia has appropriated and misused the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle to justify its military intervention in extraterritorial conficts. Parody has served as a heuristic device to dilute the legitimacy of the original norm by pointing out that it is just one socially constructed reality-making script (Burai 2016).
Civilizational essentialization refers to the eforts of authoritarian states to articulate regionalized identities and values that challenge the proclaimed universal norms and identities imposed by hegemonic powers. Informed by Huntington’s (1997) clash of civilizations thesis, civilizational essentialization suggests an inter-community contestation between diferent normative communities. For example, in Russia’s case, the concept of the Russian world has been developed by Russian elites to encompass the broad region inhabited by Russian speakers, Russian ethnics, and Orthodox believers. The common thread that unites this geographical space is a collective commitment to Russian spirits that contrast with western liberal values (Bettiza & Lewis 2020). This concept of the Russian world creates an inter-community contestation that challenges the universal norms and identities imposed by the West.
In this sense, civilizational essentialization can be seen as a form of resistance to the universal norms and values promoted by the West. It refects a desire to assert regional identities and values that are distinct from those of the West. However, as Bettiza and Lewis (2020) argue, civilizational essentialization is not limited to authoritarian states. Rather, it is a phenomenon that can be observed in various contexts, including democratic states. Civilizational essentialization highlights the importance of considering regional identities and values in international relations and the need for a nuanced understanding of the dynamics of inter-community contestation.
Counter-norm entrepreneurship refers to the promotion of illiberal norms, ideas, and institutions as ideological alternatives to liberal ones. This phenomenon occurs when authoritarian powers forego contestation over the validity or meaning of liberal norms and instead innovate their own norms, such as conservative values like opposition to LGBTQ rights, strong leadership, government control, etc., to attract followers who are not attracted to liberal norms (Keating & Kaczmarska 2017). In the international domain, Russia has established the Chechen model as a peace management regime featuring coercive diplomacy (Tkachenko 2017). This discursive strategy transcends contestation over the meaning and application of existing norms and instead challenges the validity of normative systems alternative to the liberal normative system. Bettiza and Lewis’s (2020) expanded on Deitelhof and Zimmermann’s (2018), Jose’s (2018) and Wiener’s (2014) typologies of norm contestation by detailing the discursive strategies that authoritarian states use to contest the applicatory parameters, meaning, and validity of liberal norms. Additionally, their typology emphasizes the importance of narratives in constructing, interpreting, and applying norms. In the following discussion, we will elaborate on why and how narratives matter for norm contestation and how normative narratives are enacted in international broadcasting.
Norm change, narratives, and international broadcasting
While conventional scholarship on norm contestation recognizes the signifcance of discourses in assigning normative meaning, it has primarily focused on the use of argumentative discourses in institutional contexts, neglecting narrative norm contestation in vernacular situations (Acharya 2004; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Wunderlich 2020). As individuals become key constituencies of foreign policy-making, strategic narratives have become the primary non-coercive force for garnering international support through mass media platforms. As famously proclaimed by Nye (2013), politics in the information age ultimately revolves around whose story wins. A successful storytelling links the past, present, and future into a coherent narrative, helping the narrative enactor to extend their infuence, manage expectations, and gain legitimacy in a favourable discursive environment (Miskimmon et al. 2014). These strategic narratives not only restructure the temporal sequential order but also construct identities, interests, morality, defnitions, and solutions for international actors and events, thereby deconstructing or reconstructing the normative order for world politics (Miskimmon et al. 2014: 4–5). In Miskimmon and colleagues’ model (2014: 7), strategic narratives consist of three forms: identity narrative, issue narrative, and system narrative. They have pointed out that identity narratives are intertwined with system narratives, but have not fully revealed how they are connected by normative ties. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the interaction between narrative and norm change. An international order is characterized as a community that embraces common rules, norms, and institutions (Acharya 2017; Ikenberry 2018a). The acceptance and expression of specifc norms signify the acquisition of a corresponding subject position and identifcation with given political roles. Identity narratives can accomplish this by outlining the key characteristics of referent actors, such as the attributes they possess, the actions they take, and the motivations that drive their behaviours (Miskimmon et al. 2014: 32). For example, the narrative of the European Union (EU) as a normative power implies the EU’s identity as a liberal great power committed to values such as liberty, democracy, and the rule of law (Manners 2002). Similarly, Kaldor and colleagues call for a human rights narrative for the EU to forge a collective identity and legitimize its foreign policy (Union). Issue narrative functions to defne the nature of an issue or event and identify potential solutions to resolve it (Miskimmon et al. 2014). For instance, regarding the South Ossetia crisis, the narrative of the Russia-Georgia war versus responsible intervention spells diferent normative benchmarks and diferent subject positions (Badescu & Weiss 2010). In this sense, normative narratives are enveloped in the issue narrative as it contests the applicability of terms for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. Russia uses R2P to legitimize its interference, but the appropriate level and scope of intervention for massive human rights violations remain in question. System narrative captures the distribution of power and normative structure that upholds the relevant system. For example, Ikenberry’s narrative about liberal internationalism describes the main features of and justifes the endurance of the liberal world order (Miskimmon et al. 2014). The normative narratives involved in constructing and legitimating systems often contest the validity of norms and which norms are considered legitimate rules for international order.
As countries holding reformist (revisionist in its more extreme form) visions for the global order, China and Russia project neo-Westphalian system narratives that uphold absolute sovereignty for their regime security and a civilization-based hierarchical order in their sphere of infuence. In the international domain, their joint declaration on the promotion of international law also indicates a shared opposition to Western instrumental use of liberal norms and reformist aspirations for current liberal norms (Russian foreign ministry & Chinese foreign ministry, 2016).
The existing studies have demonstrated how international broadcasters, such as RT and Sputnik, have been employed to sustain Russia’s dictatorship and advance Russian foreign policy worldwide. Previous content analyses have found that conspiratorial theories have been employed to stir up anti-establishment sentiment (Yablokov 2015). Active measures, including forgeries, disinformation, military threats, and agents of infuence, have also been found to be reactivated in Russian propaganda against Northern European countries to strengthen Russia’s regional geopolitical presence (Kragh & Sebastian, 2017). Interviews within the newsroom confrm that the Soviet media legacy has been playing a lingering role in shaping RT as an opportunistic channel devoted to creating chaos within democracies (Elswah & Howard 2020). Despite RT’s apparent inability to foster a positive Russian national image, it exhibits a signifcant capacity to promote isolationist policy within the US, thereby contributing to Russia’s overarching foreign policy goals. This duality in RT’s efectiveness illustrates a nuanced approach to information warfare; its success in democratic countries lies in its capacity to conceal its Russian origin while positioning itself as an alternative provider of opinions (Wagnsson et al 2023).
The present article posits that authoritarian states leverage narratives for norm contestation in their international broadcasting eforts regarding geopolitical disputes. Using Bettiza and Lewis’s (2020) insights on norm contestation, this article defnes normative narratives as narratives that negotiate the interpretation, application, and validity of international norms in the context of foreign policy implementation or territorial dispute management systems. Specifcally, this study examines the media coverage of the Ukraine Crisis and explores how Russia conducts norm contestation by projecting normative narratives through its international broadcasters’ coverage of the geopolitical confict.
Data and Method
In order to illuminate Russia’s norm contestation strategies through their mediatedpublic diplomacy activities, this paper focuses on RT—the Russian government sponsored, multi-lingual, multi-platform news media, to display the discursive phenomenon surrounding norm contestation. RT is chosen due to its televisual platform and digital presence. According to RT’s editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan (2016) TV news outperforms other news formats, such as newspapers, radio, and social media, as it provides the most professional, comprehensive, and visual and often live media representation. In this digital age, RT actively leverages digitalisation to bypass the technical barriers to enter the global media market. RT strives to engage with global audiences by channelling its televisual news content through TV, digital streaming, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter; notably, RT became the most-watched TV news network on YouTube with the frst 10 billion viewership on record (RT, 2020). Second, RT has signifcant political importance for Russia, as President Putin proposed, RT is expected to not only provide unbiased coverage of events in Russia but also try… to break the Anglo-Saxon monopoly on global information streams (Kremlin.ru, 2013). Third, this research selected the Ukraine crisis as event cases as it is a territorial dispute not only concern Russian national interests but also prompt intensive debates over the normativity between Russia and the West (Szostek 2017).
The data for this research was gathered from RT’s YouTube platforms, with a specifc focus on their self-selected folders related to the Ukraine crisis. After screening out irrelevant videos, a total of 76 videos on the Ukraine crisis were collected, with a total duration of 11 h and 9 min. On average, the length of RT’s videos on this topic was 8 min and 49 s. We compared the data with the relevant video clips on RT’s ofcial website to ensure the representativeness of our sampling.
Liberal performance: Russia’s attack on the Western hypocrisy
Our study revealed that RT has implemented a liberal performance mode of norm contestation, which involves adopting liberal discourse to criticize the West’s divergence from its liberal commitments. As outlined by Bettiza and Lewis (2020), liberal performance operates through two strategies: discrediting the moral authority of the West by exposing their selective application of liberal norms and undermining the ontological security of Western communities regarding their liberal identity. To achieve both objectives, RT has constructed two narratives that challenge two norms: self-determination and the right to protest.
The frst narrative connects the precedent of Kosovo with the Crimean referendum to discredit Western opposition to Crimean independence. The narrative begins with the Kosovo precedent, where RT features a Kosovo protester who expresses her gratitude towards Europe, America, and the UK, stating, Thank you, Europe. Thank you, America. Thank you, Great Britain (RT, 2014d). This footage serves as historical evidence of Western involvement in the Kosovo war, as the Kosovo public attributes their independence to Western support. In addition to citing civil evidence, RT employs visual testimony from Western leaders to demonstrate their ofcial endorsement of self-determination. Specifcally, RT (2014b) employs a montage of Barack Obama, David Cameron, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, who assert their support for the right to self-determination when similar occasions arise (see Fig. 1).
By compiling and interweaving the public speeches of four politicians across multiple platforms, RT formulated a collective statement that elucidates their dedication to the principle of self-determination. The visual rhetoric employed by RT establishes the tone for its assault on Western powers’ inconsistency in disallowing the Crimean populace the right to self-determination. The logic deployed by RT suggests that if the inhabitants of the Falklands and Scotland can exercise their right to determine their own destiny, Western politicians have no legitimate grounds to deprive the Crimean people of the same entitlement. RT’s anchor avers that the sole reason why the G7 group of the world’s largest economies has deemed Crimea’s
Fig. 1 RT’s footage of Western politicians calling for self-determination referendum. Notes: Collage of the talking heads appearing in a clip by (RT, 2014d). Clockwise from top left: US President Barack Obama, UK Prime Minister David Cameron, US President Bill Clinton, and US President George W. Bush. In the montage, each politician says the following: Obama: “The referendum on self-determination.” Cameron: “Self-determination.” Clinton: “Right to speak their language.” Bush: “Be recognised by more nations around the world.” Clinton: “Shape their daily lives.” Obama: “Determine their own future… must take place.” referendum illegal is that, when it comes to self-determination or territorial integrity, the biggest clue is whether or not it fts with their own [Western] interests (RT, 2014e).
Our fndings corroborate Burai’s (2016) research, which argues that Russian authorities have frequently invoked the Kosovo precedent to validate the legal status of the Crimean referendum. Within the context of Russian international broadcasting, RT has invoked the testimony of Kosovo citizens to furnish evidence that the West has supported the Kosovo referendum in deference to the popular will. Furthermore, RT juxtaposes Western leaders’ recurrent afrmation of their allegiance to the norm of self-determination to expose the West’s selective intervention based on their national interest calculations, and the cynical nature of using normative language to cloak their geopolitical expansion (Headley 2015). The second point made by RT is a reminder to Western audiences of the West’s failure to uphold the right to protest, despite its outward support for protests overseas. According to Miskimmon et al.(2014) narratives have the power to establish causal connections between past events and future outcomes, setting them apart from regular discourse. The narrative in this case starts with an identity narrative that denounces the United States as an arbitrary actor in normative application. As guest speaker Richard Becker states, The United States government determines that some acts of government suppression somewhere in the world are quote and quote disgusting, and yet stands silent when the people rise up in Bahrain or the people who are so suppressed in Saudi Arabia are even further suppressed and repressed (RT, 2013a). This narrative contributes to shaping expectations about the West based on its historical record of manipulating the right to protest to achieve geopolitical goals. This narrative, therefore, challenges the West’s self-proclaimed identity as a champion of democracy and human rights.
RT then proceeds to compare the West’s active support for overseas protests, such as those in Ukraine, with its treatment of protests within its own community. The narrative seeks to emphasize the double standard employed by the West in its handling of internal versus external protests. Mark Sleboda, an American scholar based in Russia, substantiates RT’s narrative through his statement, Senator John McCain has not shown any such concern for Occupy Wall Street protesters when they were brutally repressed in the USA and driven from Zuccotti Park and from the main centres of America, cities across America or with protesters in Europe against neoliberal austerity measures when tens of millions received like treatment over the last two years indeed just this week in Spain, in the United Kingdom and in Italy we saw a police repression of peaceful political dissent (RT, 2013b) By referencing Sleboda’s statement, RT underscores the Western hypocrisy in its purported commitment to democratic values, as it turns a blind eye to protests in its own community while demonstrating zealous passion and support for protesters in Kiev. In furtherance of its critique of the West’s double standard on protest, RT contextualizes Mark Sleboda’s argument to highlight the harsh legal penalties for violent protest within Western societies. The voice-over in the program cites specifc legal penalties for protest-related ofenses in various Western countries, and compares them unfavourably with the much milder punishments in Ukraine. As the voice over stated, “As it stands, the protestors in Europe guilty of riot gets ten years in prison. In Ukraine it is a ffth of that. For vandalism in France, you get 7 years, in Ukraine 3. Covering yourself in a mask during a protest, in Canada it is ten years, in Ukraine 15 days” By doing so, RT seeks to prompt viewers to recognize the divergence between the principles of justice and human rights that EU countries apply to their own citizens and those applied to Ukraine, a geopolitical adversary of the West. RT suggests that the discourse on protest in the West is geared towards maintaining social stability, but is shifted towards promoting the right to protest when it comes to the West’s geopolitical rivals. This narrative implies that the West merely pays lip service to the norm of the right to protest, as civil disobedience is harshly punished within Western societies. The intention of this approach is to undermine the confdence of Western audiences in their community’s commitment to liberal values and the liberal democracy that defne their identity (Bettiza & Lewis 2020).
A Convergence of liberal mimicry and civilization essentialization: R2P in Russian Way
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a norm that has undergone intense contestation. This paper posits that norm contestation regarding R2P encompasses two strategies: liberal mimicry and civilization essentialization. Liberal mimicry, as articulated by Bettiza and Lewis (2020) refers to a meaning contestation of a particular norm without denying its validity. Our research confrms that Russia Today (RT) has reinterpreted R2P as a unidirectional responsibility by Russia towards ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the post-Soviet regions, rather than a universalist humanitarian norm (Allison 2020; Jose & Stefes 2018). We contend that RT’s contestation of R2P also involves a civilizational essentialization tactic that postulates a particularistic normative order, excluded from the universalistic liberal world order. RT draws on a civilizational imaginary of the Russian world, suggesting that Russia is entitled to impose a normative order within the imagined community of the Russian world tied to a common language and cultural legacy.
According to RT’s narrative, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine was triggered by the Kiev government’s systematic violation of the rights of Russian speakers in Ukraine. The voice-over in the narration states, One of the frst things they (new authorities in Kiev) did after storming to power was cancel Russian as the second ofcial language in regions were ethnic Russians make up the majority, causing confusion even among local civil servants (RT, 2014c). This sets the stage for a micro-level narrative to unfold, which features an interview with a Russian-speaking mother living in Crimea, chosen by RT’s correspondent. Annastasiya Vinnichenko, a resident of Crimea holding a baby in her arms, declares in the interview that The more languages you speak the more you can learn and comprehend. I want my child to be able to learn all of them without any restrictions (RT, 2014b). This statement serves as a testimony to the Crimean people’s fear of repression from the postrevolutionary Ukrainian authorities and constructs an existential threat that requires emergency measures to restore order.
The existential threat faced by Russian speakers underscores their cultural insecurity, leading them to seek support from Russian authorities, as noted by RT. Eric Draitser, a political commentator, observed in response to Anna’s statement that Everything that is perceived to be Russian is currently under attack, so it is understandable why Crimea and other parts of eastern Ukraine are gravitating towards Moscow, as a means of self-defence (RT, 2014b). Draitser generalizes the revocation of the ofcial status of the Russian language as a form of cultural repression experienced by Russian speakers in Crimea. He frames Russia’s interference in the Crimean afair as a rescue mission that was requested. By doing so, RT transforms the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm from a responsibility that the international community bears towards large-scale massacres carried out by state governments to one that focuses on cultural insecurity and shifts the responsibility from the international community to a protectorate state that shares the same ethnicity.
The justifcation for Russia’s interference in the Crimean afair involved a dualtrack approach, incorporating both a request from overseas compatriots and an active rescue by the protector state. This narrative was most explicitly articulated by RT’s anchor, Bill Dod. During a newscast, Dod responded to British politician Brooks Newmark’s accusation that Putin had exploited the Ukraine crisis for his domestic political support. Dod countered, stating, “And what about the idea that people in with Russian origins feel that they could well be persecuted indeed indications that there’s an extremist element within the Kiev government who indeed talked about outlaw in Russian as an ofcial language in Ukraine just a few days ago, has he not a right to protect the rights of ethnic Russians in a neighbouring country?”(RT, 2014c). In doing so, Dod embeds a new interpretation of R2P, which allows a country to protect its expatriates or the interests of national language speakers in another country. This interpretation echoes the excuse used by Germany to occupy Sudetenland and constitutes a reappropriation of the R2P norm by Russia, designating it as the central power within a geographical imagery of the Russian world, where Russia is responsible for protecting Russian compatriots.
The term Russian world was initially coined by Putin in 2001 to refer to an expansive imagined community that unites Russian citizens and compatriots who share commonalities such as the Russian language, ethnicity, Orthodox Christianity, history, and destiny (Laruelle 2015). The Russian language plays a particularly signifcant role as a cultural symbol in uniting this imagined community, as highlighted in Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly:
The Russian language not only preserves an entire layer of truly global achievements but is also the living space for the many millions of people in the Russian-speaking world, a community that goes far beyond Russia itself (Putin 2007).
In 2009, a policy was implemented to ease the process of obtaining Russian citizenship for Russian speakers and descendants of residents of Russia or the Soviet Union (which was further upgraded in 2014), providing de facto protection to Russian speakers facing ethno-cultural, political, or professional discrimination in Russia’s near abroad (Laruelle 2015). Following the Ukrainian government’s revocation of the regional language status of the Russian language in 2014, Russian authorities deemed it a violation of the human rights of the Russian ethnic minority and claimed a responsibility to protect them against systematic oppression in Ukraine. Echoing the Russian authority’s narrative, RT not only ofers an alternative interpretation of R2P but also outlines the boundary for this normative order. Within the bounds of the Russian world, Russia occupies a central position to bear the responsibility of protecting Russian speakers in overseas territories against the intervention of extraterritorial powers.
Counter‑norm entrepreneurship: deconstructing Ukrainian
sovereignty
The article contends that RT has used a counter-norm strategy to dismantle the concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly in the context of Ukraine. RT has relied on a geopolitical imaginary, Novorossiya, to achieve this goal. Novorossiya, which translates to ‘New Russia,’ refers to the vast landmass that presently constitutes Ukraine’s southern agricultural and eastern industrial heartland. The geographical area is rooted in the Russian Empire’s legacy of expansionism in a contested borderland against the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century. The residents of the land of Novorossiya have historically comprised mixed ethnicities, including Russians, Ukrainians, Romanians, and Tatars (Kuzio 2019). While Novorossiya has been used as a tool for territoriality to reconfgure space for geopolitical gains, it has become an instrument of secessionist cartography in the Ukraine crisis. (Agnew 2005). The Donbas rebels have reworked Novorossiya to justify the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk from Ukraine (O’Loughlin et al. 2017). Novorossiya has not only served as a popular rallying fag but has also entered Russian ofcial discourse:
I would like to remind you that what was called Novorossiya back in the tsarist days– Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev, and Odessa, were not part of Ukraine back then. These territories were given to Ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet government. Why? Who knows? (Putin 2014).
In his address, Putin endeavoured to disengage South-eastern Ukraine as an autonomous region, as if it had been granted as a benevolent gesture through an inscrutable re-allocation of administrative borders during the Soviet era. By emphasizing the fortuitousness of Novorossiya’s annexation to Ukraine, Putin summoned a polarizing imagination of Ukraine as an artifcial state that was arbitrarily constructed, instead of evolving organically from a strong historical foundation (O’Loughlin et al. 2017) (Fig. 2). Given Ukraine’s failure to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the southeast of Ukraine (Putin 2014), the only remedy Putin proposed was for Russia to intervene and emancipate the population from oppression.
As we will see in the following analysis, RT employed a map to visualize Novorossiya as a distinct geographical area and deny Ukraine’s sovereign independence as well as territorial integrity.
Utilizing multimedia presentation techniques, RT constructed a visual narrative of Novorossiya as a secessionist geopolitical construct in order to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty through fragmentation (see Fig. 3). This visual discourse
Fig. 2 Map of Novorossiya claimed by eastern Ukrainian rebels. Note: Map by author, adapted from O’Loughlin et al. (2017), page 9, Fig. 2. According to O’Loughlin et al. (2017), Novorossiya is proclaimed by eastern Ukrainian rebels as a secessionist imaginary. It includes eight oblasts of southeast Ukraine: Odessa, Mykolayiv, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhya, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk aimed to convey the message that political attitudes in Ukraine towards the Yanukovych government were divided, with the western region violently protesting against the pro-EU government while the southeastern part remained supportive of the proRussian Yanukovych government. For instance, in an episode (RT, 2014a), correspondent Alexey Yaroshevsky annotated a map to indicate that the population in the Southeast supported the current government, while the pink and red regions denoted contested or violently conficted territories. The yellow region referred to the areas where local governments had been overthrown by pro-Ukrainian EU protesters.
Fig. 3 RT’s footage of a Ukrainian Map. Source: clip RT (2014a)
The reporter urged the audience to contemplate that public backing for both
pro- and anti-Yanukovych administrations was evenly distributed, as evidenced by
the statement, And you can see for yourself, this is pretty much a ffty, ffty division (RT, 2014a). However, this fragmented visual discourse is problematic in two respects. First, by subdividing western Ukraine into three sections and designating eastern Ukraine as a united block, RT overstated the proportion of pro-Russian regions within Ukrainian territory. Second, this map of public opinion appears inconsistent with the revealed survey data. Even among the populace of the eight oblasts in Novorossiya, 44.1% of individuals denied the historical basis for Novorossiya independence, compared to only 14.7% who supported it (O’Loughlin et al. 2017). More crucially, the Novorossiya project failed to garner support in six of the eight oblasts included, taking hold only in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Toal & O’Loughlin 2015). By fragmenting Ukraine into disparate spaces with divergent political identities, RT created several political communities within Ukraine’s borders and undermined Ukraine’s territorial integrity as a sovereign state.
Conclusion
This paper applies norm contestation theory to the context of international broadcasting in order to unpack the normative narratives formulated by authoritarian propaganda that aims to project alternative interpretations of norms or propose competitive norms. The study contributes to Bettiza and Lewis’s (2020) analytical framework on authoritarian states’ norm contestation by empirically testing it. Specifcally, the analysis identifes and examines the tactics employed by Russia Today (RT) in its norm contestation eforts.
Firstly, the paper identifes that RT has employed the tactic of liberal performance to undermine the normative authority of the West in upholding the liberal order. By citing the precedent of Kosovo, RT accuses the West of selectively applying the self-determination norm to advance its own geopolitical interests. Furthermore, RT
reveals Western hypocrisy in upholding democratic values by pinpointing the harsh discipline of internal protests and the tolerance of pro-West external protests.
Secondly, the study fnds that RT has combined the tactics of liberal mimicry and civilizational essentialization in its contestation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm. Through citing the statement of a Crimean citizen as a micro-level narrative, RT substantiates its macro-level narrative about the Kiev government’s infringement on Russian language speakers. In justifying Russia’s interference in Crimean independence, the media reappropriates the meaning of R2P from a collective responsibility of the international community to a patriarchal protection by Russia over Russian ethnics and Russian speakers in the neighbouring region. While Russia may not explicitly seek to expand its unique interpretation of R2P, its international broadcaster hints that within the civilizational space of the Russian world, Russia enjoys a special right to impose its paternal protection over so-called compatriots tied with Russia for common cultural bonds.
Finally, the study identifes counter-norms in RT’s coverage of the Ukraine Crisis, specifcally through the activation of Novorossiya as a secessionist geographical imaginary. By doing so, RT attempts to deconstruct the statehood and sovereign integrity of Ukraine. The study’s fndings illustrate the various tactics used by authoritarian propaganda in contesting international norms and the complexities of such contestation eforts.
This article expands the literature on norm contestation by exploring the realm of international broadcasting. The authors contend that norm contestation is not solely an exchange of discourse between elites, but its success depends on active engagement with foreign audiences to persuade, co-opt, or rhetorically trap targeted leaders (Miskimmon et al. 2014: 107; Schimmelfennig 2001). In addition to fndings about Russian propaganda’s overt use of active measures and disinformation (Richter 2017; Yablokov & Chatterje-Doody 2021; Kragh & Sebastian, 2017), it delineates the nuanced argumentative strategies employed by Russian propaganda in engaging with liberal norms. The article also examines the selfserving reinterpretation and reconstruction of these norms, thereby adding a layer of complexity to our understanding.
The research illuminates a perplexing observation unearthed by previous investigations: RT, despite its Russian origin, has garnered substantial attention and resonance among Western audiences (Wagnsson et al. 2023). Our paper provides a plausible explanation for that. RT’s success in attracting Western audiences and establishing itself as an alternative media source within Western society might lie in its strategic utilization of language and narratives that resonate with the West. Specifcally, RT creates a sense of familiarity and legitimacy by intricately engaging with the liberal democratic values and norms embraced by Western mainstream media. Methodologically, it sheds light on the potential for unpacking verbal-visual narratives in multimodal newscasts for norm contestation among international audiences. Future research could beneft from comparative analyses of how various authoritarian regimes employ mass media to contest norms, as well as exploring how audiences perceive and accept normative narratives projected by authoritarian public diplomacy during times of geopolitical crises.
